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Abstract 
Defining income mobility is not a trivial matter, where both practical and technical 
considerations depend on the perspective of the researcher. This study provides a literature 
review of three important analytical considerations when measuring income mobility. First, I 
review several definitions of income mobility and how each concept is operationalized using 
empirical data. The study shows that income mobility estimates based on various definitions 
do not necessarily agree in levels and trends. Using a simple simulation experiment, I find a 
general linear relationship among the income mobility indices considered and the strength of 
the correlation depends on the income mobility concept being measured. Second, the study 
reviews the impact of both classical and non-classical measurement error on income mobility 
estimates. Unlike previous studies that suggest that measurement error always inflates income 
mobility, the simulation experiment reveals that the different features of measurement error 
can lead to either downward or upward bias. Third, high level of income mobility may also 
represent economic insecurity when it is driven by fluctuations in the transitory component of 
income. Thus, it is important to examine mobility of permanent and transitory components of 
income using different econometric methods. 
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1. Introduction  
While conventional measures of income poverty, income inequality and other indicators of 
economic development are useful for gauging a country’s socio-economic progress, most of 
these analytical tools only provide static snapshots of a country’s growth performance. 
However, sole reliance on these static development indicators may mask important features 
of a country’s development process. For example, while small changes in cross-sectional 
estimates of income poverty and inequality portray a stagnant income distribution at the 
macro-level, it may also be characterized by strong offsetting effects between large income 
gains of some poor individuals and large income losses of others at the micro-level. On the 
other hand, high income inequality may merit less concern when it is possible for an 
individual to work his way up the social hierarchy. This emphasizes the importance of 
examining income mobility patterns in conjunction with cross-sectional indicators of poverty 
and inequality. In general, income mobility can be linked to a concept of a ladder where the 
ladder represents the income distribution. Some individuals climb up while others go down.  
High income mobility rates are traditionally associated with social justice as it allows those 
who are initially poor to get out of socio-economic dearth.  However, high income mobility 
rates may not always be desirable. At the extreme case, complete reversal of incomes wherein 
the richest swaps income with the poorest, second richest swaps income with the second 
poorest and so on, will still give the same cross-sectional estimates of poverty and inequality 
but at the same time will portray a highly unstable income distribution.  
Examination of income mobility trends is important for policy planning as different income 
mobility regimes call for different mix of socio-economic policies. By measuring income 
mobility patterns, research can provide important inputs that will enable socio-economic 
planners to develop more efficient evidenced-based policies. However, examining income 
mobility patterns is not a trivial matter and various practical and technical considerations 
need to be taken into account. First, the multi-dimensional feature of income mobility lends 
itself to a number of ways to measure it using empirical data. As different measures may 
produce varying trends, it is important to examine more than one dimension of income 
mobility. At the same time, practicality dictates that examining all dimensions may cause 
more confusion than good. In other words, measuring mobility in terms of all of its 
dimensions may just lead to a bewildering array of numbers. Thus, analysis should strike a 
balance between having to provide a thematic discussion while trying to paint a 
comprehensive picture of the income mobility process.  To be able do this, it is important to 
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examine the relationship among the different income mobility concepts. Second, incomes 
reported in household surveys are prone to measurement error. If left unaddressed, the 
presence of measurement errors may render estimated levels of income mobility biased and 
thus, lead to misleading conclusions. Third, it is important to distinguish whether the 
observed income mobility reflects changes in permanent or transitory components of income. 
Although high income mobility rate tends to taper-off the adverse consequences of high 
income inequality when it is driven by positive changes in permanent income, it may also 
reflect an unstable income distribution when much of the mobility comes from unexpected 
fluctuations in transitory income.  
The main objective of this study is to provide a literature review of several important 
analytical considerations when estimating income mobility. While Jenkins (2011) and Fields 
(2008) provide general discussion of measurement issues that are critical when one examines 
the income distribution from a longitudinal perspective, here, I provide more detailed 
discussion of three topics. First, I review the various definitions of income mobility used in 
the existing literature and shows that estimates based on various definitions do not 
necessarily agree in levels and trends. Second, I examine the behaviour of the most 
commonly used income mobility measures in the presence of measurement errors. I find that 
the different features of the measurement error can have offsetting effects on the severity of 
the bias on income mobility estimates. Third, I descrive a methodology for decomposing 
income mobility into its two fundamental components: permanent and transitory income. 
This allows us to differentiate between mobility as a desirable outcome and mobility as risk.  
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. First, I discuss the importance of examining 
income mobility. Then I review the different conceptualizations of income mobility and how 
each definition is measured empirically.  Using simulated data, I also examine the effect of 
measurement errors on income mobility estimates. Furthermore, I also differentiate income 
mobility as a corrective tool for the adverse effects of inequality from income mobility as an 
indicator of socio-economic insecurity.  The last section summarizes the main results.  
 
2. Why it is important to examine income mobility?  
From a policy perspective, measuring income mobility is important because different income 
mobility levels call for different mix of socio-economic policies. In theory, there are several 
possible income mobility regimes that may be observed for a given society. Zero mobility 
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and perfect mobility are the two extreme cases. A society is said to have zero mobility if there 
is a complete persistence of the income distribution and perfect mobility when all individuals 
are income mobile. In empirical application, the true income mobility regime often falls in 
between these two extreme cases. When income mobility is low, previous studies suggest that 
individuals find less merit to work hard as the distribution of socio-economic opportunities is 
perceived to be inequitable (McNamee and Miller 2013). This is true, in particular, if low 
levels of income mobility are accompanied by very high poverty rates and high income 
inequalities. In this context, the underlying economic development process may exhibit 
prominent poverty traps wherein those who are at the bottom of the income distribution are 
being systematically marginalized. In other words, without any mobility-enhancing 
intervention, the poor are likely to remain poor. This represents a significant waste of human 
resources (ADB 2012, OECD 2008). In such scenario, finding an appropriate redistributive 
policy (e.g., conditional cash transfer) might be the way to move forward.  Second, when low 
levels of income mobility are accompanied by low to moderate poverty rates with high 
income inequalities, then much of the rigidity may be occurring at the top of the income 
hierarchy. In a society where cumulative advantage is persistent, creation of more high 
quality jobs and provision of trainings to meet the skill-requirement of these jobs might be 
the way to expand the income mobility prospects of other segments of the population. On the 
other hand, a modest increase in inequality may not be too problematic (i.e., regarded as 
inequality of outcome) if it is accompanied with high levels of income mobility and 
decreasing poverty rates. Up to some extent, this increasing inequality of outcome may be a 
necessary feature of a progressive economic system that is focused on uplifting the standard 
of living of the poor. On the other hand, it is also worth pointing out that high levels of 
income mobility need not always be a desirable outcome. This is particularly true when 
mobility is mainly driven by large fluctuations in transitory income as this would represent a 
very unstable economic system (Jarvis and Jenkins 1998). Analogously, low levels of income 
mobility may also be regarded as a good indicator if it represents a mature economy that has 
already achieved long-run equilibrium. By measuring and examining income mobility 
patterns, research can help socio-economic planners identify more efficient evidenced-based 
policies for these economic development regimes.1 However, as will be elaborated in the 
next section, income mobility has multiple definitions (Fields 2008 and 2010). Naturally, the 
                                                          
1 
It is often regarded that static analysis of development is more suitable for treating symptoms of social 
exclusion while a more dynamic analysis allows us to tease out causal relations among different factors and thus 
plan a more effective intervention of escaping social exclusion. 
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ideal level of income mobility as well as the appropriate policy interventions depend on how 
income mobility is conceptualized within the context of a society’s stage of development. 
 
3. Income Mobility Concepts 
Over the years, a number of conceptual definitions have been proposed in the income 
mobility literature. In fact, Fields (2010) identified more than 20 different income mobility 
measures that are currently being used. While these measures may differ in terms of 
functional forms and how each individual’s income movements are aggregated to come up 
with an overall income mobility estimate, Ferreira et al. (2013) argued that the choice of 
income mobility concept to be examined goes beyond these technical distinctions. For 
instance, the objective of one’s study interacts powerfully with the different concepts of 
income mobility such that some concepts are more relevant for specific research questions 
that in others. This section reviews several definitions of income mobility and how each 
concept is operationalized using empirical data. In reviewing the different income mobility 
concepts that are commonly used in the literature, this section adopts the taxonomy used by 
Fields (2000 and 2008). In particular, income mobility is conceptualized into three broad 
groups: mobility as movement, mobility as origin independence and mobility as equalizer of 
long term income.
2
 Without loss of generality, the discussions in this section assume that the 
observation period consists of two time points. For notation purposes, I use Yit  to refer to the 
income of the i
th
 individual at t
th
 time period where i =1, 2, …, N at time t =1,2.  Interested 
readers may also refer to the works of Fields (2008 & 2010), Fields and Ok (1999), Solon 
(1999), Maasoumi (1998), Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992), Cowell (1985), 
King (1983) and Shorrocks (1978) for more comprehensive discussion. 
The first main perspective views mobility as movements in income. It has four sub-concepts. 
First, income mobility is gauged in terms of gross movements or what is commonly referred 
to as “income flux”. Operationally, this approach entails estimating the absolute value of the 
difference between Yi1 and Yi2. Second, mobility may be measured with respect to net 
movements in incomes. Since the individual income differences Yi2 – Yi1 are estimated 
instead of taking the absolute value |Yi2 – Yi1|, this (sub-) concept implicitly distinguishes 
                                                          
2
 It can be argued that these three income mobility perspectives are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Jenkins 
(2011) categorized the concepts of income mobility into four broad groups: mobility as positional change, 
mobility as individual income growth, mobility as reduction of longer-term inequality and mobility as income 
risk. In his discussion, the mobility as origin-independence perspective proposed by Fields (2000 and 2008) is 
subsumed under mobility as positional change.  
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upward from downward income mobility. Third, mobility as movement may also be 
measured in terms of changes in relative income or income shares 
𝑌𝑖1
∑𝑌𝑖1
 - 
𝑌𝑖2
∑𝑌𝑖2
. Fourth, 
mobility may be measured with respect to positional movement. This concept entails 
quantifying the extent of re-ranking from Yi1 to Yi2. Under the positional movement 
perspective, perfect mobility is encapsulated when each individual’s income destination is a 
complete reversal of his/her income origin. Unlike the first two (sub-) concepts, mobility 
based on income shares and mobility based on positional movement examine changes in an 
individual’s income in relation to the incomes of everyone else in the society. Thus, an 
individual’s mobility depends not only on whether his/her income changed over time but also 
on how the change alters his/her income share or income rank (Jenkins 2011).
3
  
Income mobility may also be examined with respect to the extent to which an individual’s 
income in the past influences his/her current income (Lillard and Willis 1978). Hence, the 
second main perspective views income mobility with respect to origin or temporal 
dependence. Empirically, this is gauged in terms of the correlation between Yi1 and Yi2. 
Under this perspective, mobility is high when an individual’s income destination is weakly 
related to one’s income origin. In other words, the basic property underpinning origin 
independence-based measures is that a more mobile society is one where an individual’s first 
period-income is less important in predicting his/her income in the succeeding periods 
(Ferreira et al. 2013).  
The third main perspective views mobility as equalizer of long-term incomes. In general, an 
individual’s income at any given time will differ from his/her average income taken over 
several successive time periods. Using these longitudinally averaged incomes will smoothen 
the longitudinal variability in each individual’s income as well as the variability across 
individuals.
4
 Under this perspective, mobility is characterized in terms of the speed at which 
inequality is reduced as the observation period is lengthened (Shorrocks 1978 and Jenkins 
2011).
5
 In general, mobility is high when the inequality in longitudinally-averaged income is 
less than the inequality at any particular point in time (Ferreira et al. 2013). The rationale 
behind introducing this perspective is to evaluate the extent to which long-term incomes are 
distributed more or less equally over time.  It is particularly appealing because it directly 
                                                          
3
 Under the positional movement concept, it is not possible for all individuals to be uniformly upwardly (or 
downwardly) mobile (Jenkins 2011).  
4
 The longitudinally averaged income is usually referred to as the permanent or long-term income. 
5
 The speed of inequality reduction depends on the chosen inequality measure (Schluter and Trede 2003).  
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links income mobility with inequality. For socio-economic researchers, it is important to 
examine whether an increase in income mobility can contribute to transitory variations in 
income so that permanent income inequality would be less than observed income inequality 
(Jarvis and Jenkins 1998). In other words, high income inequalities in fluid societies might be 
less problematic because the distribution of lifetime income would be generally even through 
income mobility (Krugman 1992). Table 1 provides a summary of the different 
conceptualizations of income mobility and the corresponding indices that measure these 
concepts. While the list is not exhaustive, these are the most commonly used in empirical 
studies of income mobility. 
 
Table 1. Income Mobility Indices based on Different Conceptualizations 
 
Source: Fields (2000 and 2008) 
 
To examine how income mobility trends may vary depending on how mobility is 
conceptualized, consider the examples of several income mobility scenarios based on a four-
individual society that are presented in Table 2.  First, we can use the two income vectors 
provided in Scenario A to illustrate the difference between gross and net income changes, i.e., 
non-directional and directional income mobility, two of the four sub-concepts under the 
mobility as movement perspective. In this scenario, the incomes of the two individuals 
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increased by one unit each while the remaining two noted a unit decline in income. Thus, 
Scenario A portrays non-zero gross income movements but negligible net income 
movements. In other words, if we do not consider the direction of the income changes, we 
can say that there is income mobility in Scenario A. However, when we subtract the negative 
income differences from the positive income differences, we say that there is no income 
mobility under Scenario A. Scenario B, on the other hand, can be used to illustrate the 
difference between directional and non-directional income mobility and mobility based on 
changes in income share or income ranks. Since the income of each individual doubled in 
Scenario B, everyone observed positive gross and net income movements. However, since 
each individual’s share to total income and income rank remained fixed, it also portrays 
negligible mobility based on the concepts of share and positional movement. Scenario C 
illustrates the difference between mobility as movement and mobility as origin independence 
perspectives. The income vectors provided in Scenario C portray a rank-reversal scenario 
wherein the initially poorest swaps income with the initially richest, the initially second 
poorest swaps income with the initially second richest, and so on. In this example, the 
correlation between the two income vectors is -1. Since the initial income vector perfectly 
predicts the values of the final income vector, we can say that there is negligible mobility 
based on the origin independence perspective. At the same time, since the observed increases 
in the income of the initially two poorest individuals offset the observed income declines of 
the remaining two individuals, we can say that there is no directional income mobility in 
Scenario C. However, since all individuals observed change in both the actual income levels 
and income ranks, Scenario C portrays a mobile society in terms of non-directional income 
mobility and positional movement. Lastly, Scenario D illustrates the difference between 
mobility based on origin independence and mobility as equalizer of long-term income 
perspectives. The relatively high yet negative correlation (-0.8) between the two income 
vectors implies that there is low income mobility based on the origin independence 
perspective. However, since inequality in average income (4.5, 3, 4.5, 3) is lower compared 
to either the initial or final income vector, we can say that there is mobility based on the 
concept of equalizer of long-term income.  
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Table 2. Examples of Income Mobility Scenarios 
Scenario Initial income vector Final income vector 
A (1, 2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 2, 3) 
B (1, 2, 3, 4) (2, 4, 6, 8) 
C (1, 2, 3, 4) (4, 3, 2, 1) 
D (1, 2, 3, 4) (8, 4, 6, 2) 
 
In income mobility studies, we often see seemingly conflicting results across different 
analytical approaches even though in most cases, the same data set was used.  In many cases, 
these “inconsistencies” stem from the fact that they measure different aspects of income 
mobility (Fields 2008). In general, the differences are not necessarily of limited practical 
interest because each concept corresponds to inherently distinct notions of what mobility is 
(Ferreira et al. 2013). Figure 1 illustrates this point.  Using simulated data, I compare the 
relationship among different income mobility indices. While there is a general linear (either 
positive or negative) relationship among the indices considered, the strength of the 
correlation depends on the income mobility concept being measured. For instance, indices 
that do not differentiate between downward and upward income mobility (e.g., Fields-Ok’s, 
King’s, average rank jump, Hart’s and Shorrocks’ indices) are strongly correlated with each 
other but exhibit more variability when compared to equalization indices and poverty 
dynamics. Thus, it is important to explicitly identify which concept is being examined as the 
conclusions will depend on this choice.  
In summary, the broad point that the discussions in this section seek to convey is that to be 
able to provide a more holistic picture of the underlying income mobility process, it is 
important to examine income mobility based on different perspectives. This is because there 
is hardly a single mobility measure that can adequately capture all income mobility concepts 
at the same time. In many cases, a satisfactory measure of one particular concept may be a 
poor measure of another. However, calculating too many income mobility indices may also 
result in a confusing array of numbers. Instead of providing a more comprehensive view of 
the income mobility process, this may just obscure the big picture.   To strike a balance 
between these two considerations, a possible approach is to focus on a core set of indicators. 
To reduce the dimension, one may decide to choose one or two indicators among income 
mobility indicators that are highly correlated with each other while ensuring that most of the 
dimensions are covered.  
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4. Impact of Measurement Error and Data Contamination  
Although the analytical tools presented earlier are useful for measuring income mobility, the 
discussions assume that income is measured accurately.  However, previous studies suggest 
that income, particularly those derived from household surveys, are prone to measurement 
errors (Glewwe 2012, Gottschalk and Huynh 2010; Bound and Kruger 1991; Duncan and Hill 
1985). If measurement error is significant, the results of income distributional analysis may 
produce biased results and thus, lead to misleading conclusions and policy implications. In 
addition, the effect of measurement errors can vary across different indicators of income 
mobility. This section examines how estimates of different income mobility indicators behave 
in the presence of measurement errors. For notation purposes, I use Yit  and Yit
*
 to refer to the 
observed and true income, respectively, of the i
th
 individual at t
th
 time period where i =1, 2, 
…, N and t =1,2. I also denote the (natural) logarithm of Yit  and Yit
* 
 by Zit and Zit
*
, 
respectively. The term vit=ui*eit represent the time-invariant and time-varying measurement 
errors such that Zit = Zit
*
 +  ln(vit). Hence, Yit  =  Yit
*
vit. 
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Figure 1. Correlation of Income Mobility Indices 
 
Source: Author’s computations using simulated data and the Stata tools for income mobility analysis developed by Van Kerm (2002). 
Note: The simulated data is available upon request from the author.  
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What are the common sources of measurement errors? The most basic forms of data 
contamination may arise from randomly misreporting income or data encoding mistakes. 
Conventionally, these errors are assumed to average out (i.e., zero-mean) and are uncorrelated 
with the true income. In statistical parlance, this is referred to as classical measurement error. 
Classical measurement errors contribute to additional noise in observed incomes and findings 
from previous studies suggest that they lead to biased estimates of cross-sectional poverty and 
inequality (Jenkins 2011). In poverty estimation, Chesher and Schluter (2002) concluded that 
the severity of the bias induced by classical measurement error in estimates that use 
distribution-independent poverty line will depend on the level at which the poverty line is set 
and the number of individuals with incomes near this poverty threshold. On the other hand, 
the bias may be more severe when the analysis is anchored on a distribution-dependent 
poverty line.  Furthermore, as can be seen in the derivation below, the variance of the 
observed income overestimates the variance of the true income in the presence of classical 
measurement error. Hence, estimates of inequality which can be expressed as functions of the 
variance of income are also inflated in the presence of classical measurement error (van 
Praag, Hagenaars and van Eck 1983). Moreover, the derivation below suggests that when the 
measurement error is correlated with the true income, the direction of the bias for the variance 
of income depends on the ratio of the covariance between the true income and the 
measurement error and the variance of the measurement error. In particular, a negative 
correlation can offset the inequality-increasing effect of the additional variability introduced 
by the measurement error.  
 
                                   𝑉 𝑍   = 𝑉 𝑍  
∗ +    𝑣                                                          (1)  
                   𝑉 𝑍   = 𝑉 𝑍  
∗  + 𝑉    𝑣    +  2  𝑣 𝑍  
∗     𝑣                                 (2) 
                             𝑉 𝑍   = 𝑉 𝑍  
∗   if    𝑣 𝑍  
∗     𝑣    =   0.5𝑉    𝑣                          (3) 
                  𝑉 𝑍    𝑉 𝑍  
∗   if    𝑣 𝑍  
∗     𝑣       0.5𝑉    𝑣                           (4) 
                  𝑉 𝑍   < 𝑉 𝑍  
∗   if    𝑣 𝑍  
∗     𝑣    <   0.5𝑉    𝑣                           (5) 
 
While several studies have examined the effect of measurement errors on cross-sectional 
estimates of poverty and inequality and have proposed adjustment procedures to correct the 
bias induced by these errors (Ravallion 1994, Chesher and Schluter 2002), not much has been 
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said about the extent of measurement error bias on income mobility estimates.
6
 The few 
studies that have tackled the issue of measurement error when estimating mobility focus only 
on the origin independence perspective. These previous studies suggest that measurement 
errors make income less correlated over time. Consequently, there seems to be more income 
mobility in the presence of measurement error (Glewwe 2012). However, this conclusion does 
not necessarily hold when mobility is conceptualized in other ways. For instance, even under 
classical assumptions, Boheim and Jenkins (2006) noted that the effect of classical 
measurement error on poverty dynamics is less clear. Furthermore, when the magnitude of the 
measurement error is severe, some studies have hinted that the observed income mobility 
would likely be an artefact of the contamination of the income data. For example, Glewwe 
(2012) find that between 15% to 42% of observed mobility in Viet Nam in the 1990s can be 
considered as upward bias due to measurement errors in Vietnam Living Standards Survey. 
Krebs, Krishna and Maloney (2013) also find that the effect of measurement errors on income 
mobility estimates in Mexico to be non-negligible. In such cases, estimates of observed 
mobility may lead to incorrect inferences for development policies. Thus, it is important to 
investigate the magnitude of the effect of measurement error on income mobility estimates. 
To contribute to this gap in the literature, this study briefly extends the discussions by 
examining the effect of measurement errors on different indicators of income mobility 
presented in the previous section.   
When income is measured with error, the true historical income profile denoted by {Yi1
*
 , 
Yi2
*
} is unobserved. In turn, the estimated mobility of observed income {Yi1 , Yi2}  will reflect 
the changes in the joint distribution of the true income and measurement errors (Yi1
*
 , Yi2
*
, ui, 
ei1, ei2).  First, suppose mobility is defined with respect to non-directional income movement 
such that the income mobility is a function of the absolute difference between the (natural) 
logarithm of income, i.e., | Zi2 - Zi1 |. In particular, consider the Fields-Ok index. We can see 
in the derivation below that the magnitude of the bias is bounded above by the total non-
directional mobility reflected in the measurement errors.
7
 In particular, it is intuitive to think 
that the size of the bias will depend on the levels and variability of the measurement error.  
  
                                          
 
 
∑ |  (
𝑌𝑖2
𝑌𝑖1
)| =  
 
 
∑     
𝑌𝑖2
∗ 𝑣𝑖2
𝑌𝑖1
∗ 𝑣𝑖1
                                                      (6) 
                                                          
6
 Glewwe (2007) also showed that when both income and its measurement errors follow a lognormal 
distribution, the estimated mean income of the poor and income growth of the poor are biased.  
7
 The derivation above is robust in the presence of a time-invariant component ui in the measurement error as that 
term will cancel out.   
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∑  𝑍 2
∗   𝑍  
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Second, suppose mobility is measured using the Hart’s index which is based on the 
correlation between the (natural) logarithm of the initial and final income. Under classical 
measurement error, Cov(Zi1, ln(vi1)) = Cov(Zi1, ln(vi2)) = Cov(Zi2, ln(vi1))  = Cov(Zi2, ln(vi2)) 
= 0.  In this context, the numerator of 𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2  is the same as the numerator of 𝜌 𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗  . 
However, since the denominator of 𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2  is potentially higher because V(ln(vi1)) and 
V(ln(vi2)) are both non-negative, then 𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2  ≤ 𝜌 𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗  8. In turn, correlation-based 
indices of mobility for the observed income profile denoted by  𝑍   𝑍 2  will tend to 
overestimate the true (correlation-based) income mobility implied by {𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗  .   
 
                                            𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2 =   
  𝑣 𝑍𝑖1 𝑍𝑖2 
√𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑍𝑖1 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑍𝑖2 
                                         
(10) 
                                         𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2 =   
  𝑣 𝑍𝑖1
∗ +ln 𝑣𝑖1  𝑍𝑖2
∗ +ln 𝑣𝑖2  
√𝑉(𝑍𝑖1
∗ +ln 𝑣𝑖1 )𝑉 𝑍𝑖2
∗ +ln 𝑣𝑖2  
                               
(11) 
  𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2 =   
  𝑣(𝑍𝑖1
∗  𝑍𝑖2
∗ )+  𝑣(𝑍𝑖1
∗  ln 𝑣𝑖2 )+   𝑣( 𝑍𝑖2
∗  ln 𝑣𝑖1 )+  𝑣 ln 𝑣𝑖1  ln 𝑣𝑖2   
√[𝑉(𝑍𝑖1
∗  +𝑉 ln ln 𝑣𝑖1 )+2   𝑣 𝑍𝑖1
∗  ln 𝑣𝑖1  ][𝑉(𝑍𝑖2
∗ )+𝑉 ln 𝑣𝑖2  +2  𝑣 𝑍𝑖2
∗  ln 𝑣𝑖2 ]
        
(12) 
 
In empirical application, measurement errors are not always classical in form. In some cases, 
observed incomes may be systematically flawed.  Misunderstanding the reference period (e.g., 
misreporting weekly as monthly income), under-reporting income to evade tax obligations, 
over-reporting income to impress interviewers are some examples when this could happen 
(Krebs, Krishna and Maloney 2013; Glewwe 2007). In this context, it may not be safe to 
assume that the measurement error is distributed with zero mean. In addition, measurement 
errors may also be auto-correlated over time wherein some individuals have fixed propensity 
to misreport their income (Bound, Brown, Duncan and Rodgers 1994 and Pischke 1995). For 
example, self-employed often confuse personal income from business expenditures due to 
                                                          
8
 As pointed out in (12), the denominator of 𝜌 𝑍   𝑍 2  is equal to the denominator of 𝜌 𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗   when 
  𝑣 𝑍  
∗     𝑣    =   0.5𝑉    𝑣    . 
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lack of adequate accounting records, leading to erroneous income estimates (Deaton 1997; 
Daniel 2001).   Furthermore, measurement errors may also be negatively correlated with true 
income if high income individuals are likely to report lower income while low income 
individuals are likely to inflate their reported income (Deaton 1997)
9
. In general, the severity 
of the bias on mobility estimates due to measurement errors will depend on how income 
mobility is defined and how the measurement errors are distributed. For instance, recall the 
derivation for the Fields-Ok index. As pointed out earlier, the magnitude of the bias is 
increasing with the level of the measurement error. On the other hand, in addition to the 
variability of the measurement errors, the severity of the bias on the Hart’s index depends on 
two additional factors: the covariance of the measurement error with the true income and the 
covariance of the measurement error over time.  
In this study, we consider different forms of measurement errors. However, even if the form 
of measurement error is known, providing an analytical derivation to infer the direction of the 
bias it induces on mobility estimates is not always straightforward for each concept of income 
mobility.  Hence, we turn to a simple simulation experiment to gauge the impact of 
measurement errors on different income mobility indicators. As pointed out earlier, we 
assume that the measurement error is linearly additive with the (natural) logarithm of income. 
Moreover, the measurement error can be decomposed into time-invariant and time-varying 
components as described below.  
 
(i) 𝑍  = 𝑍  
∗ +        ,  𝐸         = 𝜇 ,  𝑉           = 𝜎 𝑖 
2 ,      𝑍  
∗          = 𝜌, 
                  2  = 𝛿 
 
Here, the measurement error is assumed to be time-varying. When 𝜇 = 0, 𝜌 = 0, and 𝛿 = 0, 
the measurement error is a white noise process. The classical measurement error is subsumed 
in the time-varying component. In particular, setting 𝜇 , 𝜌 and/or 𝛿  to be non-zero yields 
different forms of non-classical measurement errors. For instance, when 𝜇  > 0, individuals, 
on the average, are likely to over-estimate their true income. On the other hand, setting  𝜌 > 0 
portrays the scenario when high income individuals tend to under-estimate (or under-report) 
their true income while low income people tend to over-estimate their true income. In 
                                                          
9
  Compared to when income is measured in terms of earnings, some studies suggest that the extent of 
measurement error is less severe when income is measured in terms of household consumption. Nevertheless, 
consumption data is not free from measurement error. For instance, Scott and Amenuvegbe (1990) find that 
reported consumption decreases with the length of the recall period.   
15 
 
addition, the measurement errors are correlated over time when 𝛿 ≠ 0. For this configuration, 
the simulation experiment entails drawing from the multivariate normal distribution10 such 
that  𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗               2   ~𝑀𝑉  𝜇 𝛴𝑢   where μ’ = (𝜇𝑍1∗, 𝜇𝑍2∗, μe, μe) and  
 
𝛴𝑢
=
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜎𝑍1∗
2   𝑣 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗ 𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍1∗
2 𝑉         0
  𝑣 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗ 𝜎𝑍2∗
2 0 𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍2∗
2 𝑉      2  
𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍1∗
2 𝑉         0 𝑉         𝛿 ∗ √𝑉         𝑉      2  
0 𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍2∗
2 𝑉      2  𝛿 ∗ √𝑉         𝑉      2  𝑉      2  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
(ii) 𝑍  = 𝑍  
∗ +    𝑢  +    e   , 𝐸         = 𝜇 ,      𝑍  
∗     𝑢   = 𝜌, 
     𝑍  
∗          = 0,         𝑢           = 0  
 
Here, the non-classical measurement error is subsumed in both the time-invariant and time-
varying components. The time-invariant component ui can be perceived as a constant 
propensity of an individual to under- or over-overestimate their true income. It explicitly 
forces the measurement error to be correlated over time. For the second configuration, I draw 
from the multivariate normal distribution such    that      
 𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗     𝑢                2   ~𝑀𝑉  𝜇 𝛴𝑢    where     μ’ = (𝜇𝑍1∗, 𝜇𝑍2∗, 0, μe, μe)        and  
 
𝛴𝑢 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝜎𝑍1∗
2   𝑣 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗ 𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍1∗
2 𝑉    𝑢   0 0
  𝑣 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗ 𝜎𝑍2∗
2 𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍2∗
2 𝑉    𝑢   0 0
𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍1∗
2 𝑉    𝑢   𝜌 ∗ √𝜎𝑍2∗
2 𝑉    𝑢   𝑉    𝑢   0 0
0 0 0 𝑉         0
0 0 0 0 𝑉      2  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                          
10
  Glewwe (2007) noted that the effect of measurement error is robust even if one departs from the normality 
assumption, particularly when measuring income growth of the poor. 
11
  If 𝑍  
∗  is strongly correlated with 𝑍 2
∗ , then the correlation between the error terms    e    and    e 2  may not 
be totally independent of Corr 𝑍  
∗  𝑍 2
∗  . In other words, forcing Cov(   e   ,    e 2   to be zero may produce 
non-positive semi-definite 𝛴𝑢. In such cases, we allow Cov(   e   ,    e 2   to be non-zero.  
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For the simulated true income data, I set 𝜇𝑍1∗ = 3.9, 𝜇𝑍2∗ = 4. This assumes that the growth in 
mean income is equal to approximately 10.5% (= exp(4)/exp(3.9) – 1). In addition, the 
assumed true variances for the (natural) logarithm of income are not unrealistic. In empirical 
studies, a value of 0.5 for the variance of the (natural) logarithm of income is on the high side 
for expenditure data but in the low side for income data (Glewwe 2007).  Furthermore, the 
simulated data assumes that   𝑣 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗ = 0.9 ∗ √𝜎𝑍1∗
2 𝜎𝑍2∗
2 = 0.9 ∗ 0.5 = 0.45. In other 
words, we assume that Corr(𝑍  
∗ , 𝑍 2
∗ ) = 0.9. Overall, these parameters values portray a 
relatively low income mobility.  Table 3 shows the mobility estimates based on the simulated 
true income.  
 
Table 3. Mobility based on Simulated True Income 
(Low Income Mobility Scenario) 
    Indicator Estimate 
Ave movement 0.48 
Immobility 0.57 
Hart 0.10 
Shorrocks 0.05 
King 0.22 
CDW 0.02 
Ave rank jump 10.13 
Fields-Ok 0.26 
Fields 0.02 
                                               Source: Author’s computations using simulated data 
 
For the measurement error, I allow different values for 𝜎 
2 such that the measurement error 
inflates the observed variance of the (natural) logarithm of income by 0%, 5%, 10% up to 
40%. In addition, we also allow μe to be non-zero to represent instances when the observed 
incomes are systematically under- or over-estimated. The measurement error is also allowed 
to be correlated with the true income. We simulated 1000 data sets for each permutation of 
parameter values.  
The estimates in Tables 4 to 6 present the results when the measurement error consists of only 
time-varying component. The figures presented in Table 4 show that, on the average, classical 
measurement error leads to overestimation of all income mobility indices and hence, 
underestimation of immobility measures. Nevertheless, the results also suggest that there 
could also be substantial variability in the extent of the bias within each mobility indicator. 
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The severity of the bias depends on the indicator being used.  Among the indices considered, 
the effect of classical measurement error tends to be smallest for measures based on mobility 
as movement perspective, particularly the average quintile move, immobility ratio and Fields-
Ok indices.  On the other hand, the effect of classical measurement error is most-severe when 
using CDW and Fields indices which are both based on the mobility as equalizer of long-term 
income perspective. Recall that positive values for these indices suggest socially desirable 
mobility while negative values suggest undesirable mobility. Note that the results of the 
simulations suggest that it is possible for classical measurement errors to change the sign of 
the mobility estimates and yield misleading conclusions.
12
  At the same time, the magnitude 
of the measurement error also depends on by how much the measurement errors increase the 
variance of the (natural) logarithm of the observed income. For instance, focusing on the 
average quintile move, our simulations suggest that when measurement error overestimates 
the variance of the (natural) logarithm of income by a factor of q = 5%, the true income 
mobility is only 85% of the observed mobility. The extent of overestimation of the average 
quintile move index can be as large as 50% if measurement errors inflate the variance of 
(natural) logarithmic income by 40%.  
 
  
                                                          
12
 This could be an artefact of the values we assigned for the parameters of the measurement error. Recall that 
since CDW and Fields indices are both functions of income inequality as discussed in the previous section, then 
they are also implicitly related to the variance of income. Since we assume that the variances of the true income 
is fixed over time (i.e., V(Zi1
*
) = V(Zi2
*
)) and that its temporal correlation is high (i.e., Corr(Zi1
,
Zi2
*
) = 0.9), then 
we would expect that the true mobility based on CDW and Fields indices will be very small (approaching zero). 
Consequently, small perturbations in the income data caused by measurement errors may produce significantly 
different results.   
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Table 4. Robustness of Income Mobility Indicators to Classical Measurement Error 
(Mean Ratio of Actual to Observed Mobility) 
Income Mobility 
Indicator 
V    e    = q ∗ V Zit
∗   
q=0.05 q=0.1 q=0.15 q=0.20 q=0.25 q=0.30 q=0.35 q=0.40 
Ave. quintile move 0.85 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.53 0.53 
Immobility ratio 1.09 1.19 1.29 1.32 1.36 1.46 1.49 1.52 
Hart (correlation) 0.70 0.55 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 
Shorrocks 0.71 0.56 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.29 
King 0.83 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.52 
CDW 0.68 0.46 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.16 
Ave. rank jump 0.84 0.74 0.68 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.54 0.53 
Fields-Ok 0.83 0.73 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.46 
Fields 0.75 0.53 0.45 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.35 0.27 
Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
 
To examine different forms of non-classical measurement error, I first allow         to be 
distributed with non-zero mean. In particular, I set μe to be proportional to 𝜇𝑍 ∗ and assume 
that the variance of the measurement error does not raise the variance of the (natural) 
logarithm of the true income, i.e., ln(eit) = ln(et).  Although not shown here, the results suggest 
that this type of measurement error has nil effect on mobility estimates. In other words, when 
a constant value is added to each of the individual’s (natural) logarithm of income, such that 
μe is proportional to 𝜇𝑍 ∗, the mobility estimates are mostly unaffected. On the other hand, if 
ln(et)’s are random, we can see that among the mobility indicators considered in this study, 
only the Fields-Ok index is clearly affected by measurement errors with non-zero mean.  
 
Table 5.  Robustness of Income Mobility Indicators to Classical Measurement Error 
(Actual - Observed Mobility) 
Income Mobility Indicator 
  
𝛍𝐞 = 𝐪 ∗ 𝛍𝐙𝐭∗ 
(assuming 
V e   = 0.05 ∗ 𝑉 𝑌  
∗  ) 
q= 0  q= 0.01 q=0.05 q=0.1 
Ave. quintile move -0.2630 -0.2565 -0.2599 -0.2580 
Immobility ratio 0.1277 0.1245 0.1247 0.1238 
Hart (correlation) -0.1418 -0.1396 -0.1421 -0.1424 
Shorrocks -0.0667 -0.0656 -0.0667 -0.0670 
King -0.1176 -0.1180 -0.1193 -0.1189 
CDW -0.0355 -0.0377 -0.0370 -0.0364 
Ave. rank jump -5.4898 -5.3672 -5.4646 -5.4688 
Fields-Ok -0.1688 -0.1692 -0.1704 -0.1723 
Fields -0.0310 -0.0319 -0.0321 -0.0313 
            Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
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Next, the numbers provided in Table 6 show the robustness of the mobility estimates when I 
allow the measurement error to be correlated with the true income, i.e., 𝜌 ≠ 0. Here, I find 
that the (relative) bias is smallest when ρ = -0.7. Hence, the severity of bias is not necessarily 
increasing or decreasing with the correlation between the measurement error and the true 
income. This is consistent with the derivation presented for the Hart’s index in the first part of 
this Section. In general, it seems that the severity of the bias for different income mobility 
indicators will depend on the interaction between the covariance of the measurement error 
with the true income and the variance of the measurement error.  
 
Table 6.  Robustness of Income Mobility Indicators to Measurement Error  
that is Correlated with True Income 
(Mean Ratio of Actual to Observed Mobility) 
Income mobility indicator 
     𝑍  
∗          =  𝑞 
(assuming V    v   =  .05 ∗ 𝑉 𝑌  
∗  ) 
q = -0.9 q = -0.7 q = -0.3 q = 0 q = 0.3 q = 0.7 q =0.9 
Ave. quintile move 1.09 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.72 
Immobility ratio 0.96 1.01 1.07 1.11 1.16 1.18 1.21 
Hart 1.16 0.99 0.80 0.70 0.61 0.56 0.52 
Shorrocks 1.16 1.00 0.80 0.70 0.62 0.56 0.52 
King 1.07 1.01 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.74 0.73 
CDW 1.15 1.23 0.84 0.73 0.57 0.45 0.37 
Ave. rank jump 1.07 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.72 
Fields-Ok 1.07 1.00 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.73 0.70 
Fields 1.18 1.29 0.86 0.78 0.61 0.50 0.41 
      Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
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Table 7. Robustness of Income Mobility Indicators to Non-Classical (Zero-Mean) 
Measurement Error that is Correlated with True Income  
(Mean Ratio of Actual to Observed Mobility) 
Income Mobility 
Indicator 
 
𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐫 𝐙𝐢𝐭
∗  𝐥𝐧 𝐮𝐢  = 𝒒  
 
(assuming V e   = 0.05 ∗ V Yit
∗ ) 
q= -0.9 q =-0.6 q =-0.3 q =-0.1 q =0.1 q =0.3 q =0.6 q =0.9 
Ave. quintile move 0.79 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.96 1.00 1.03 
Immobility ratio 1.15 1.10 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.00 0.99 
Hart 0.63 0.70 0.78 0.82 0.88 0.92 1.00 1.07 
Shorrocks 0.63 0.70 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.93 1.00 1.07 
King 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 
CDW -20.82 -64.24 0.31 0.32 1.08 -0.02 1.80 -0.32 
Ave. rank jump 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.93 0.96 1.00 1.03 
Fields-Ok 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Fields -9.29 1.93 2.28 3.23 1.28 3.37 1.54 -4.53 
Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
 
The estimates in Table 7 also departs from the classical measurement error setting by allowing 
its time-invariant component to be correlated with the true income. Similar to the findings 
earlier, the impact of measurement errors tend to be smallest for movement-based measures 
and largest for equalizer-based measures. Interestingly, as the correlation increases positively, 
some of the mobility estimates (e.g., average quintile move, immobility ratio, Hart’s, 
Shorrocks, and average rank jump indices) tend to be less biased. Up to some extent, this is 
consistent with the findings of Glewwe (2007) who concluded that consistent estimation of 
(correlation-based) mobility indices is easier when the measurement error has the same 
amount of mobility implied in the joint distribution of income.  However, when measurement 
errors are negatively correlated with the true income, my findings suggest that for most of the 
indicators, the magnitude of bias becomes more severe as the correlation between the 
measurement error and the true income increases negatively.  
Table 8 provides the results when the measurement error is dominated by either the time-
invariant or time-varying component.  Interestingly, as the variation of the measurement error 
that can be attributed to a fixed propensity to commit an error increases, the effect of 
measurement error on mobility estimates tend to taper-off.   This result is quite intuitive 
especially when we are measuring relative mobility since the term ui will tend to cancel out if 
we take the ratio of the initial and final income.  
To examine the effect of each parameter of the measurement error on income mobility 
estimates simultaneously, I regress 𝑀𝑟𝑎   =  𝑏𝑠  
𝑀(𝑌𝑖1 
∗ 𝑌𝑖2
∗ )
𝑀 𝑌𝑖1𝑌𝑖2 
    on V    ui +    eit  , 
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Corr Zit
∗     ui  , 
V ln ui  
V ln ui +ln eit  
 and μe. The main point of Table 9 is that, in general, the 
different parameters of the non-classical measurement error have offsetting effects on the bias 
in income mobility estimates. In particular, whereas the magnitude of the measurement error 
bias is an increasing function of both the mean and the variance of the measurement error, the 
bias decreases when the time-invariant component dominates the measurement error and is 
positively correlated with the true income. Furthermore, the result suggest that income 
mobility is not always overestimated in the presence of non-classical measurement errors.  
 
Table 8. Robustness of Income Mobility Indicators to Non-Classical (Zero-Mean) 
Auto-correlated Measurement Error  
(Mean Ratio of Actual to Observed Mobility) 
Income Mobility 
Indicator 
 
𝑽 𝐥𝐧 𝒖𝒊  
𝑽 𝐥𝐧 𝒖𝒊 + 𝐥𝐧 𝒆𝒊𝒕  
 = 𝒒 
 
(assuming V e   = 0.05 ∗ 𝑉 𝑌  
∗  ; Corr Zit
∗     ui  = 0.6)  
q= 0.1 q=0.2 q=0.3 q=0.4 q=0.5 q=0.6 q=0.7 q=0.8 q=0.9 
Ave. quintile move 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.93 0.96 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.14 
Immobility ratio 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.03 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.93 
Hart 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.85 0.93 0.99 1.08 1.18 1.29 
Shorrocks 0.67 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.94 1.00 1.09 1.19 1.29 
King 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.96 
CDW 0.33 -0.04 2.32 -9.85 0.57 -0.18 -0.11 -0.10 0.74 
Ave. rank jump 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.93 0.96 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.14 
Fields-Ok 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.95 
Fields -0.21 0.59 0.20 0.75 -7.29 1.46 0.39 1.59 2.54 
Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
 
Table 9. Effect of Measurement Error Parameters on Income Mobility Estimates 
Income Mobility 
Indicator 
V    ui 
+    eit   
μe Corr Zit
∗     ui   
V    ui  
V    ui +    eit  
 
Ave. quintile move 0.59 0.01 -0.15 -0.24 
Immobility ratio 0.70 0.01 -0.18 -0.26 
Hart  0.86 0.00 -0.22 -0.35 
Shorrocks 0.84 -0.03 -0.21 -0.33 
King 0.70 0.00 -0.01 -0.29 
CDW -4.84 10.77 -1.38 2.49 
Ave. rank jump 0.59 0.01 -0.15 -0.24 
Fields-Ok 0.46 0.44 0.00 -0.19 
Fields 29.56 
-
20.72 
12.41 -6.54 
             Source: Author’s computations using simulated data.  
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Robustness of Findings for Other Income Mobility Regimes 
The previous section implicitly assumed that the true income mobility regime was relatively 
low. In this context, the results presented earlier suggest that, on the average, the true income 
mobility tends to be overestimated in the presence of either classical or non-classical 
measurement errors. Moreover, the severity of the bias on mobility estimates increases as the 
variance of the measurement error increases.  On the other hand, the bias tends to taper-off 
when much of the variability of the measurement error can be attributed to its time-invariant 
component. In this section, we investigate whether these conclusions also apply for higher 
income mobility scenarios. To do this, I use the following parameter values for the true 
income. Table 10 shows the estimated true mobility based from each of the configurations 
depicted below.  
 
Scenario 1 
𝜇𝑍1∗ = 3.9,  𝜇𝑍2∗ = 4.2,  𝜎𝑍1∗
2 = 0.5,  𝜎𝑍2∗
2 = 0.3,       𝑍 
∗  𝑍2
∗ = 0.6 
 
Scenario 2 
𝜇𝑍1∗ = 3.9,  𝜇𝑍2∗ = 4.5,  𝜎𝑍1∗
2 = 0.5,  𝜎𝑍2∗
2 = 0.2,       𝑍 
∗  𝑍2
∗ = 0.3 
 
Table 10. Mobility based on Simulated True Income 
(Medium and High Income Mobility Scenarios) 
 
                                              Source: Author’s computations using simulated data. 
 
 
Income 
Mobility 
Indicator 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Ave. quintile 
move 
0.98 1.31 
Immobility 
ratio 
0.35 0.26 
Hart 0.41 0.70 
Shorrocks 0.21 0.37 
King 0.32 0.34 
CDW 0.13 0.20 
Ave rank 
jump 
20.66 27.48 
Fields-ok 0.53 0.76 
Fields 0.20 0.35 
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After replicating the same process implemented in the previous section, I find that on the 
average, the mobility estimates still tend to be overestimated in the presence of measurement 
errors although the severity of the (upward) bias seems to be less pronounced for higher 
income mobility regimes. This is quite intuitive in the sense that as the true income mobility 
increases, there is less room for overestimation. In addition, it is interesting to note that unlike 
in the low-mobility scenario wherein our simulation suggests that all mobility indicators were 
overestimated in the presence of classical measurement error, here, I encountered several 
instances when the average quintile move and the Fields-Ok indices are underestimated by 
classical measurement error. This proves that measurement errors do not always inflate 
income mobility estimates upwards. Overall, the same factors contribute to the severity of the 
bias on income mobility estimates due to measurement errors. In particular, the variance of 
the measurement error generally inflates the bias on mobility estimates especially when the 
error is time-varying. The interaction between the covariance of the time-varying 
measurement error with true income and the variance of the measurement error also affects 
the severity and the direction of the bias. Furthermore, bias on income mobility estimates 
decreases as the time-invariant component dominates the measurement error.  
 
Correcting for Measurement Error 
The results presented in the previous section emphasize that the effect of measurement errors 
on income mobility estimates are not always trivial. Given this information, how do we 
correct for measurement errors when examining income mobility trends? There are several 
ways to do so. For instance, if the main income data source is household survey, survey 
records may be matched with reports by the same respondents from administrative data that 
are assumed to be error-free. In turn, this supplementary data can be used to derive 
appropriate income adjustment factors.  In particular, some studies use tax data records to 
correct for the potential bias present in the data on observed income
13
.  On the other hand, 
some researchers minimize measurement error by restricting the sample to population groups 
that are less likely to misreport income. For example, Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) proposed 
excluding those who are self-employed or those whom a large portion of income is imputed 
from the analysis.  Furthermore, others rely on more sophisticated statistical modeling 
                                                          
13
 However, this approach may not be relevant for many developing countries where such type of administrative 
tax data is usually inaccessible if not unavailable. Several validation studies also find that survey data on income 
contain substantial measurement errors (Jenkins 2011). Moreover, the findings also depart from the classical 
assumptions regarding measurement errors.   
 
24 
 
techniques. In particular, when estimating income transition matrices, one can fit latent class 
Markov models (Worts, McDonough and Sacker 2010 and Breen and Moisio 2004) to gauge 
the impact of measurement errors on income transition matrices. Given sufficient length of 
longitudinal data, the main idea behind this approach is to assume that the true transition 
probabilities are stable over time and this can be estimated from the Markov model. The 
resulting residuals are considered measurement errors. On the other hand, the use of 
instrumental variables is an alternative statistical tool that can be used to address the bias 
caused by measurement error. This is particularly useful when the concept of origin-
independence is being used. In particular, consider the dynamic model,  
 
                                                  𝑍  
∗ =   𝛼𝑍    
∗ +  𝛽𝑋   +   + 𝜀                                         (13) 
 
where 𝛼 is the income mobility parameter of interest, Xit is a vector of individual 
characteristics at time t,    is time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity for individual i and εit is 
a random disturbance term. In a two-period setting, the corresponding model with 
measurement error is given by 
 
            𝑍 2 =   𝛼𝑍  +  𝛽𝑋   +   +    𝛼    𝑢  +      2  𝛼        + 𝜀 2               (14) 
 
In this model, α is the mobility parameter of interest which corresponds to the income 
elasticity. If this dynamic model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS), the estimate 
for α is biased due to and measurement error. The idea behind instrumentation is to use a 
proxy variable that is highly correlated with the outcome of interest but is uncorrelated with 
the measurement error. For instance, Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed to use the income of 
lagged two periods as an instrument. However, in this context where there is unobserved 
individual-level heterogeneity   , the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator may not be entirely 
appropriate because the income of lagged two periods is still correlated with the time-varying 
component of the measurement error. Thus, a more suitable approach is to take the first 
difference of Equation __ and use generalize method of moments using income of lagged 
three or more periods as instrument (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen 1988).  On the other 
hand, when income mobility is measured in terms of the Hart’s index, Glewwe (2011) also 
used instruments to consistently estimate the parameters of the following models,  
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                                               𝑍  
∗ = 𝑏 𝐿𝑆
∗ 𝑍 2
∗ +   𝐿𝑆
∗ + 𝜖                                                 (15) 
                                               𝑍 2
∗ = 𝑏2𝑆
∗ 𝑍 2
∗ +  2𝐿𝑆
∗ + 𝜖 2                                                (16) 
 
Since it can be shown that the temporal correlation of income can be approximated by the 
parameters of these models, i.e., 𝑝   √𝑏 𝐿𝑆
∗ 𝑏2𝐿𝑆
∗ =  𝜌 𝑍 
∗ 𝑍2
∗  where 𝑏 𝐿𝑆
∗  is the OLS slope 
coefficient derived from regressing 𝑌 
∗ on 𝑌2
∗ while 𝑏2𝐿𝑆
∗  is the OLS slope coefficient derived 
from regressing 𝑍2
∗ on 𝑍 
∗, then the problem at hand is to find suitable instruments to 
consistently estimate  𝑏 𝐿𝑆
∗  and 𝑏2𝑆
∗  using the observed incomes  𝑍  𝑍2  which have 
measurement errors
14.  In a more general setting and/or in the absence of reliable instruments, 
one can follow the approach adopted the previous section. In particular, one can conjecture 
several different forms of measurement error and create synthetic data of measurement errors 
by drawing from its assumed distribution. In turn, this can be incorporated to the observed 
income and estimate different income mobility indicators. This approach will allow us to 
construct bounds for income mobility estimates
15
.  
 
5. Decomposing Income into Permanent and Transitory Components16 
An individual’s current income can be decomposed into its permanent and transitory 
components. Permanent income refers to an individual’s (average) income over a long 
horizon. On the other hand, transitory income refers to income received from unanticipated 
sources. Transitory income can be either positive or negative but it is expected to average out 
in the long-run. Understanding whether observed mobility is a result of movements in either 
permanent or transitory income is important for policy planning. Let us take the case of 
poverty dynamics as an example. Without distinguishing poverty persistence from transient 
poverty, policy planners may not be able to properly target intended program recipients. For 
                                                          
14
 Several studies have tackled the issue of measurement error on income mobility estimates using instrumental 
variables (Abowd and Card 1989, Cowell and Schluter 1998, Meghir and Pistafferi 2004, Khor and Pencavel 
2008, Glewwe 2011 and Krebs, Krishna and Maloney 2012). Antman and McKenzie (2007) also tackled the 
issue of measurement error when estimating income mobility. However, the author’s approach entails 
transforming the data into cohort-averages.  
15
 The same approach was adopted by Khor and Pencavel (2008) when estimating income mobility in China 
using Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data. In particular, the authors find that when the mean of the 
simulated error is approximately 10% of the mean of measured income, the average quintile move in urban 
China increases by approximately 4% while immobility ratio increases by 5%. 
16
 The notations used in this section follow that of Jenkins (2011).  
26 
 
instance, it is possible for the transiently poor to receive disproportionately more benefits than 
the persistently poor. In this context, transient poverty posts a significant constraint on the 
effectiveness of chronic poverty reduction programs (Jalan and Ravallion 1998). 
Nevertheless, while it makes sense to spend more effort to alleviate the living conditions of 
the persistently poor, it is also useful to establish environments with risk-coping mechanisms 
and enhance the security of the transiently poor (Deaton 1991). Moreover, it is also important 
to examine the dynamics in the transitory component of income as the cumulative effects of 
temporary income fluctuations among the poor could eventually lead to poverty persistence, 
especially when there are irreversible asset losses (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000, Hoddinott 
2006).   
In general, the relevance of decomposing income mobility due to dynamics in permanent and 
transitory income is manifold. First, it allows us to understand the incentive and security 
aspects of income mobility. For instance, the prospect of upward or downward mobility in the 
long-run, provides incentives for individuals to be engaged in productive economic activities. 
This is referred to as the incentive aspect of income mobility and is primarily concerned with 
the dynamics of permanent incomes. On the other hand, the security aspect of income 
mobility is contextualized within the assumption in economic theory that individuals are risk 
averse (Kaufmann 1980; Sinn 1981). In other words, for an average individual, the ability to 
predict future income is important when planning consumption behavior. Thus, people 
become more concerned on the arrangement of expenditures when income streams are 
fluctuating due to mobility of transitory income (Fachinger and Himmelreicher 2012). 
Second, decomposing income mobility into its permanent and transitory components allows 
us to distinguish income mobility as a desirable outcome from income mobility as an indicator 
of instability (Friedman and Kuznets 1954).
17
 In particular, income mobility is desirable when 
the growth in an individual’s permanent income is negatively correlated with his initial level 
of income as such type of growth pattern allows the poor to catch-up with the rich (Benabou 
and Ok 2001). In this context, income mobility makes the distribution of opportunities more 
equitable in the long-run (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrisson 1992). On the other hand, 
income mobility may be perceived as an indicator of socio-economic insecurity when it is 
                                                          
17
 Analogously, cross-sectional estimates of inequality may also be decomposed into inequality due to disparities 
in permanent income and inequality due to varying income fluctuations. Up to some extent, income inequalities 
arising from disparities in permanent income may be associated with inequality of opportunities.  
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mostly driven by fluctuations in short-term income (Rohde, Tang and Rao 2011; Allanson 
2008; Creedy and Wilhelm 2002; and Jarvis and Jenkins 1998)
18
.  
How do we decompose income into its permanent and transitory components?  There is a 
wide range of literature discussing permanent-transitory decompositions of income. One of 
the most commonly used approach is to estimate variance-components models with varying 
complexity and conditioned on various covariates (Gustavsson 2007; Moffitt and Gottschalk 
2002; and Dickens 2000; Zandvakili 2002; Ramos 2003; Geweke and Keane 2000). In 
particular, suppose that an individual’s income can be expressed as a function of a permanent 
individual-specific component and an idiosyncratic random component such that 
 
                                                                        𝑌  = 𝑢 𝑣                                                              
(17) 
 
or alternatively,  
                                                                      𝑍  = 𝑢 
′ + 𝑣  
′                                                           
(18) 
 
For simplicity, I assume that 𝑢 
′ is distributed with mean zero and a fixed variance that is 
constant across all individuals 𝜎𝑢
2  while 𝑣  
′  is distributed with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑣 
2 .  
Assuming that the idiosyncratic component is uncorrelated with the observed income, then the 
total variance can be decomposed into two components: the variability of individuals’ 
permanent incomes and the variability of the transitory shocks.  
 
                                                                 𝜎 
2 = 𝜎𝑢
2   + 𝜎𝑣 
2                                                             
(19) 
 
Thus,  
                   𝜎 +𝑟
2   𝜎 
2 =  𝜎𝑢
2   + 𝜎𝑣 +𝑟
2    𝜎𝑢
2   + 𝜎𝑣 
2  =  𝜎𝑣 +𝑟
2   𝜎𝑣 
2                              (20) 
                                                          
18
 Jenkins (2011) argues that fluctuation in transitory income is not a perfect indicator of economic instability. 
This is because income fluctuations may arise from voluntary choices made by an individual. For example, if an 
individual voluntarily decides to work shorter hours, the resulting income fluctuations will not necessarily imply 
insecurity.  
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Equation 20 implies that, assuming that the variability of individuals’ permanent incomes are 
constant over time, temporal changes in income inequality can be expressed as a function of 
temporal changes in inequality of transitory shocks encountered by all individuals. In other 
words, changes in inequality over time reflect the changes in income risks. However, 
researchers argue that Equation 20 are not grounded on realistic assumptions and variations of 
this model have been proposed over the years. Here, we consider three alternative 
specifications for the model of the transitory and permanent income components. 
  
          Alternative Model 1.    𝑍  = 𝜑 𝑢 
′ + 𝑣  
′  ;  𝜎 
2 =  𝜑  
2𝜎𝑢
2   + 𝜎𝑣 
2                              (21) 
         Alternative Model 2.    𝑍  = 𝑢 
′ + 𝑣  
′  ;  𝑣  
′ =  𝜔𝑣    
′ +  𝜋𝜀   𝑞 + 𝜀                        (22) 
          Alternative Model 3.    𝑍  = 𝑢  
′ + 𝑣  
′  ;  𝑢  
′ = 𝑢    
′ + 𝜏                                       (23) 
 
The addition of a time-specific term 𝜑  in the first model allows the relative importance for 
overall inequality of the permanent and transitory income to change over time. For example, 
an increasing returns to skilled labour may be analogous to the growing importance of the 
permanent component. The second model views the transitory component as an ARMA(p, q) 
process
19
. In general, it portrays instances when the effect of the transitory component is 
persistent beyond the observation period. For example, the effect of a pilot intervention 
program may have long lasting effects for some of the selected program beneficiaries.   The 
third model allows the “permanent” component of an individual’s income to vary over time. 
For example, an accidental injury which causes major health changes can have long-lasting 
effects on an individual’s long-term income.  
While the econometric literature offer several estimation methods to fit the variance 
component models described above using longitudinal data, there are several issues regarding 
the use of parametric models. For instance, Shin and Solon (2011) argued that parametric 
models are in some sense, “arbitrary mechanical constructs” such that the estimates can be 
sensitive to variations in how the underlying model is specified. In addition, choosing which 
parametric model is more appropriate in different contexts is not an easy task. Another 
potential issue about the use of parametric variance components models is that it requires 
panel data of adequate length to be able to estimate the model parameters consistently. 
                                                          
19
  Larger values for p or q correspond to instances when the previous income shocks have longer effect on 
current income.  In the econometric literature, many studies set p = 1 and/or q = 1.  
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However, while panel data is regularly collected in many industrialized countries, it is not 
collected frequently in developing countries.  At best, developing countries with nationwide 
longitudinal data on income have 3 to 4 waves, on the average. In this context, a simpler 
alternative approach is warranted. A candidate measure of permanent income is some central 
tendency of each individual’s incomes over a specific time period. For example, if there are 
only three waves of panel data say at time t, t+p and t+p+q, income can be averaged between t 
and t+p, and subsequently throughout t, t+p, t+p+q to be able to approximate the mobility of 
the permanent component of income. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This study presents the building blocks for the analysis of income mobility. First, it considers 
the different definitions of income mobility and how each definition is measured empirically. 
In general, the existing literature offers three broad perspectives of what income mobility 
means. In particular, mobility may refer to either movements within the income distribution, 
(temporal) independence of current income from initial income or as equalizer of long-term 
incomes. The indicators used to measure these concepts do not necessarily produce 
qualitatively similar results. Thus, when doing comparative studies, it is important to estimate 
income mobility using the same perspective to avoid comparing apples with oranges. On the 
other hand, if the objective is to provide a comprehensive snapshot of the income mobility 
regime transpiring in a society, it is important to measure mobility using different 
perspectives. To avoid unwanted complexity in the analysis, one can focus on a small set of 
indicators that measure different aspects of income mobility.  
Second, as different levels of income mobility call for different mix of policies, the study 
discusses the robustness of income mobility estimates in the presence of measurement error. 
Previous studies have shown that income data, especially those based on household surveys, 
are prone to measurement error. The results of a simulation experiment conducted in the study 
shows that mobility estimates can be severely biased when income is measured with error. In 
other words, the observed mobility may be artificially driven by mobility in the error terms 
rather than mobility of the true income. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the measurement 
error can also have offsetting effects on the severity of bias that it induces on income mobility 
estimates. For instance, a positive auto-correlation between the measurement errors can offset 
the bias-increasing effect of measurement errors on mobility estimates. The study also briefly 
identifies several approaches of correcting for measurement errors. In particular, one way to 
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make such corrections is to use external data to measure the degree of measurement bias and 
derive appropriate adjustment factors; another, to rely on finding suitable instruments to 
estimate income mobility parameters consistently. In the absence of auxiliary information, a 
general approach that can be adopted is to simulate measurement errors using relevant 
assumptions. Such simulation studies can help constructing bounds for the proportion of the 
observed income mobility that can be attributed to measurement errors.  
Third, the study also emphasizes that the normative assumption of more income mobility 
being always a desirable outcome should be examined with caution. In particular, an income 
mobility regime that is mainly driven by fluctuations in the transitory component of income 
may represent socio-economic insecurity. For policy planning, it is important to determine 
whether the observed mobility is a result of changes in permanent or transitory income. In this 
context, the study reviews several econometric methods to decompose current income into its 
permanent and transitory components. Much of the proposed procedures rely on 
characterizing the relationship between the permanent and transitory component of income 
using parametric models. If the available panel data is not of sufficient length to allow 
(consistent) estimation of the parameters of these models, one can adopt simpler techniques 
such as longitudinal-averaging of individual incomes to approximate the permanent 
component.  
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